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Home-Country Institutions and Corporate Social Responsibility of Emerging Economy 
Multinational Enterprises: The Belt and Road Initiative as an Example 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of home country institutions on corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
of multinational enterprises from emerging markets (EM-MNEs). Taking the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) as an example and using a sample with 2052 firm-year observations from China 
over the period 2008-2018, we find that the BRI exerts a positive and significant effect on overall 
CSR of Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI and the positive effect is stronger for Chinese state-
owned MNEs. In addition, only two dimensions of CSR (Employee Relations and Products) are 
improved significantly under the pressure of BRI. Finally, we examine the interactive effect of 
home- and host- country institutions on Chinese MNEs’ CSR and find the positive impact of the 
BRI on MNEs’ CSR performance is stronger in host countries with a higher level of CSR related 
institutional pressure. These results provide practical suggestions for the Chinese government and 
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MNEs to further improve CSR under the BRI, and enrich our understanding of the interactive effect 
between home- and host-country institutions on enhancing Chinese MNEs’ reputation and 
promoting regional cooperation with countries along the BRI. 
 
Key words  Home-country institutions  Corporate social responsibility (CSR)  the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI)  Host-country institutions  Institutional theory 
 
Introduction 
Over the past few decades, the research of corporate social responsibility (CSR) of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) has become an increasingly central topic in international business (Campbell, 
Eden & Miller, 2012; Kolk, 2016). MNEs operate simultaneously in multiple institutional 
environments (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011) and it is a big challenge 
for MNEs to coordinate their CSR practices globally to get legitimacy in host countries (Wijen, 
2014; Rathert, 2016). Therefore, the CSR literature is usually grounded in examining the effect of 
host-country institutions on MNEs’ CSR (e.g. Rathert, 2016; Marano & Kostova, 2016; Asmussen 
& Fosfuri, 2019; Wang & Li, 2019). However, the existing literature falls short of capturing home-
country institutional forces (Buchanan & Marques, 2018) and the full range of institutional 
arrangements MNEs encounter (Rathert, 2016). 
The rise of multinational enterprises from emerging economies that are typically characterized 
by inefficient markets, active government involvement, extensive business networking and high 
uncertainty (Xu & Meyer, 2013), has increased the importance of understanding the impact of home 
country institutions in international business research (Mathews, 2006; Luo & Wang, 2012; 
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Ramamurti & Hillemann, 2017). Although the importance of home country institutions has been 
widely studied in the context of international trade, FDI or OFDI in previous studies (e.g. Cui & 
Jiang, 2012; Hobdari, Gammeltoft, & Meyer, 2017), little research has been carried out on how 
home country institutions, especially emerging economy’s government support, affect MNEs’ CSR. 
Recent studies begin to emphasize the liability of origins resulting from home institutional voids of 
emerging economies and how EM-MNEs use CSR strategy to alleviate the disadvantages (e.g. 
Marano, Tashman, & Kostova, 2017). In fact, in emerging economies, weakly developed institutions 
and government promotions may coexist (Hoskission, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013) and 
governments in emerging economies are also important promoters and collaborators in enterprises’ 
CSR strategies’ design and implementation (Marquis & Qian, 2014; Yin & Jamali, 2016). However, 
CSR is ‘voluntary corporate practices aimed at furthering social goods and beyond the interest of 
firm’ (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001) and it is especially difficult to monitor and control MNEs’ 
overseas behavior because of the physical and cultural distance (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006). 
MNEs may respond to institutional pressure heterogeneously instead of ‘simple adaptation’ 
(Cantwell & Lundan, 2010; Newenham-Kahindi & Stevens, 2018) and thus the extent to which 
home institutions influence MNEs’ CSR after they enter host countries is still under-researched. 
Much work remains to be done on the relationship between home institutions and EM-MNEs' CSR.  
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) proposed by the Chinese government in the end of 2013 
gives us a rare research opportunity to examine the effect of home institutions on EM-MNEs’ CSR. 
The BRI is severed as a home country institution to boost bilateral and multilateral trade and 
investment (Ramasamy & Yeung, 2019) and promote in-depth and high-standard regional 
cooperation (Cheng, 2016). According to the official guidelines of the BRI, Vision and Actions on 
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Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” (Hereinafter 
“Vision and Actions”) issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of China, there are five cooperation priorities in total 
and the major goals of the BRI include policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded 
trade, financial integration and connecting people. Almost all the major goals encourage and require 
Chinese companies to actively improve their social responsibilities under the BRI. For example, in 
the aspect of “unimpeded trade”, the Vision and Actions suggests that “We support localized 
operation and management of Chinese companies to boost the local economy, increase local 
employment, improve local livelihood, and take social responsibilities in protecting local 
biodiversity and eco-environment.” In the goal of “connecting people”, the Vision and Actions 
requires that “we should organize public interest activities concerning education, health care, 
poverty reduction, biodiversity and ecological protection for the benefit of the general public, and 
improve the production and living conditions of poverty-stricken areas along the Belt and Road”. 
Therefore, the BRI is not only closely related to international trade and investment, but also contains 
important ideas about social responsibility. Existing research has studied the effect of the BRI on 
firms’ internationalization, such as export (e.g. Li, Liu, & Qian, 2019) and investment (e.g. Luo, 
Chai & Chen, 2019). However, its effect on Chinese MNEs’ CSR has not been examined. 
In addition, due to the dual embeddedness, multinational enterprises have to gain dual 
legitimacy from both home and host countries (Beddedwela, 2019; Hamprecht & Schwarzkopf, 
2014). MNEs operate across a wide variety of institutional environment (Cantwell & Lundan, 2010) 
and thus emerging economy’s multinational enterprises (EM-MNEs) need to not only consider 
institutional pressure from home countries, but also deal with various degrees of institutional 
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pressure from host countries. While host-country institutional pressure on CSR has been widely 
examined, interactions of home- and host- country institutions on CSR performance need to be 
future examined (Rathert, 2016). 
To shed light on the above questions, we take China’s BRI as an example and employ the 
difference-in-differences (DID) method. The data is obtained from the Chinese listed enterprises 
database during the period 2008 - 2018 and the impact of home country institutional pressure and 
its interaction with host country institutions on Chinese MNEs’ CSR is examined. The empirical 
results show that the BRI can significantly improve Chinese MNEs’ CSR performance. The 
positive relationship is stronger for Chinese state-owned MNEs. In addition, CSR is divided 
into six specific dimensions and the results show that only two dimensions of CSR (‘Employee 
relations’ and ‘Product’) are improved significantly under the pressure of the BRI. Lastly, we 
examine the interactive effect between home- and host- country institutions on Chinese MNEs’ 
CSR and find that the positive relationship between the BRI and Chinese MNEs’ CSR 
performance is strengthened in the host countries with higher CSR-related institutional pressure.  
This study adds to the body of knowledge in several ways. We contribute to the growing 
literature on MNEs’ CSR by identifying the impact of home country institutions on MNEs’ CSR. 
Specifically, we contribute to an institutional understanding of the BRI by revealing its unique effect 
on Chinese MNEs’ CSR which has not been examined before and providing practical suggestions 
for the Chinese government and Chinese MNEs to further improve CSR performance in order to 
maintain the legitimacy abroad and ensure smooth progress of the BRI. In addition, we contribute 
to the CSR literature and international business literature by combining home- and host- country 
institutions in one framework and examining their interactive effect on Chinese MNEs’ CSR under 
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the BRI. Overall, the research provides implications and suggestions for the Chinese government 
and the BRI to better promote Chinese MNEs’ CSR, maintain good overseas image and thereby 
enhance the mutual trust and regional cooperation among countries along the BRI. At the same time, 
we also provide suggestions about how Chinese MNEs improve their CSR in the context of dual 
embeddedness in both home- and host-country institutional environments to ensure that they can 
obtain both home and global legitimacy.  
We organize the rest of the paper in the following sections. Firstly, we outline prior literature 
and develop our hypotheses. Then we describe the variables employed, empirical models and 
estimation methods, followed by a discussion of the empirical results. Finally, we summarize our 
findings and discuss contributions and practical implications. 
 
Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Institutions and EM-MNE CSR  
Multinational enterprises operate in host countries whose political, economic, and cultural 
environments are fundamentally different with their home countries (Marano & Kostova, 2016; 
Mithani, 2017). MNEs not only have to deal with the multiple and complex demands of diverse 
stakeholders (Attig et al., 2016), but also face liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) and potential 
overseas unfriendly voices (Zahra & Garvis, 2000), which result in extra-ordinary costs for 
multinational enterprises (Zaheer, 1995; Edman, 2016). In addition, compared to multinational 
enterprises from developed markets, EM-MNEs are exposed to the liability of origin that is negative 
stereotyping by foreign stakeholders (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Pant & Ramachandran, 2012). 
Therefore, EM-MNEs have to make more efforts to gain legitimacy and facilitate the integration 
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into the local social environment (Mithani, 2017; Nachum, 2003). Research suggests that EM-
MNEs can use corporate social responsibility (CSR) to alleviate stakeholders’ negative attitudes 
(Doh, Husted, & Yang, 2016; Marano, Tashman, & Kostova, 2017). For example, Mithani (2017) 
points out that corporate philanthropy plays an important role in minimizing the perceived distance 
between local and non-local firms (Crilly, Ni, & Jiang, 2016) and hence mitigating liability of 
foreignness. 
Existing studies show that there are two main drivers of MNE CSR. On the one hand, 
multinational enterprises need to conform to external institutional pressures from host countries (e.g. 
Rathert, 2016; Beddewela & Fairbrass, 2016). On the other hand, companies need to meet their 
internal shareholders’ demands. For example, Cordeiro et al. (2018) state the desire of family 
ownership to pass on positive and superior reputation and family name and its interest in ‘socio-
emotional wealth’ motivate family firms to make a high level of CSR engagement. In addition, some 
studies increasingly focus on the interaction between firm-level characteristics and host country 
institutions. Baik and Park (2019) state that a foreign parent’s ownership share has a positive effect 
on its subsidiaries’ local community involvement and a high level of perceived trust in the host 
country weakens this relationship. 
Recently, some studies suggest that emerging economy governments may proactively create or 
change policies to improve their enterprises’ CSR (e.g. Nasra & Dacin, 2010; Xing, Liu, & Cooper, 
2018). For example, the Indian government requires that profit-making companies must spend a 
nominated portion of their net profits on CSR activities (Subramaniam, Kansal, & Babu, 2017). For 
EM-MNEs, existing studies mainly explain their CSR motivation from the perspective of the 
liability of foreignness and liability of origin EM-MNEs encounter in host countries (e.g. Tashman, 
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Marano, & Kostova, 2018; Rathert, 2016). However, considering that EM-MNEs are embedded in 
the dual institutional environments of both home and host countries, the role of home country 
intuitions should not be ignored. Wei and Nguyen (2017) argue that home country institutions are a 
critical factor influencing the strategic behaviors of EM-MNEs. Han, Liu, Xia and Gao (2018) argue 
that EM-MNEs can obtain home government support when their behaviors or strategies are aligned 
with their home governments and the study uses the ‘going global’ strategy proposed by the Chinese 
government as an example to explain the enabler role of the home-country government in enhancing 
EM-MNEs’ international competitiveness. Although there are some studies focusing on the 
importance of home institutions in firm internationalization, the role of home country institutions in 
promoting EM-MNEs’ CSR strategy, especially the role of powerful government like Chinese 
government, is still poorly understood and we still know little about the extent to which home 
country institutions affect CSR strategies of EM-MNEs after their entering host countries. 
The BRI, one of the important institutions proposed by the Chinese government to promote 
enterprises’ active participation in regional cooperation and globalization, gives us a valuable and 
rare opportunity to examine the relationship between home county institutions and EM-MNEs’ CSR. 
Home country institutions have a significant influence on firm internationalization (Cuervo-Cazurra 
et al., 2018; Gao et al., 2010; Li, Liu, & Qian, 2019) and therefore, the BRI, served as home 
institutional pressure, is expected to have an important effect on Chinese firms’ internationalization 
and their CSR. Existing research about the BRI mainly focuses on its effect on international trade 
and foreign investment (e.g. Li, Liu, & Qian, 2019). Although CSR performance may influence the 
attitudes of residents and governments towards the BRI, and hence the regional cooperation and 
globalization advocated by the BRI, BRI’s effect on Chinese MNEs’ CSR has not been examined. 
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Therefore, our research takes the BRI as a typical example of home country institutions and explores 
the impact of the BRI and its interaction with host-country institutions on Chinese MNEs’ CSR 
performance. 
 
Home country institutions (The BRI) and EM-MNE CSR 
Weak institutions and government promotions for internationalization usually coexist in emerging 
economies (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Governments in emerging economies often play a significant 
role in enterprises’ strategies (Meyer & Peng, 2005; Wright et al., 2005), especially 
internationalization strategies. The Chinese government has played an important role in encouraging 
and helping companies’ internationalization (Ramasamy, Yeung, & Laforet, 2012). On the one hand, 
the institutions in China increase the likelihood of internationalization success by facilitating 
resource access and reducing environmental uncertainty (Hung, 2005) through direct or indirect 
support (Hoskisson et al., 2013). On the other hand, Chinese enterprises’ strategies must be aligned 
with the government’s goals in order to obtain legitimacy and win resources in the domestic market 
(Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008) because governments of emerging markets with weak institutions 
usually own the majority of scarce resources (Qian, Liu, & Wang, 2018). To participate in the BRI, 
under strong government policy intervention, companies also need to meet other government-
related requirements of the BRI, for example, social responsibility of Chinese MNEs. Chinese 
MNEs serve as the main implementer of the BRI and the “overseas spokesperson” of the country 
and their CSR performance is closely related to the country's overseas image and the effect of the 
BRI on the regional cooperation and globalization.  
Institutions are defined as isomorphic pressures about how things should be conducted to get 
10 
 
legitimacy in an organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Peng, 2016). Since the 
BRI is proposed and led by the Chinese central government and perceived as a formal institutional 
force (Li, Liu, and Qian, 2019), we argue that the BRI is likely to affect Chinese MNEs’ willingness 
and ability to improve their CSR mainly through coercive and mimetic isomorphism. First, coercive 
isomorphism stems from political influences and institutional pressure exerted on enterprises by the 
stakeholders they depend on (DiMaggio & Powell,1983; Zamir & Saeed, 2018). As mentioned in 
the introduction, the BRI requires Chinese MNEs to improve their CSR in the BRI’s official 
guidelines. In addition, for example, several Chinese government departments jointly issued a policy 
called "Guidance on Promoting the Construction of the Green ‘Belt and Road’", emphasizing that 
the concept of ecological civilization should be highlighted in the BRI to promote green 
development, strengthen ecological environmental protection, and jointly build the Green Silk Road. 
Chinese enterprises must seriously follow the BRI related policies (Li, Liu, & Qian, 2019) and 
integrate the ‘social responsibility’ requirements into their international strategies to satisfy the 
Chinese government in order to obtain further legitimacy and resources for growth. 
Second, when organization goals, for example, the level of engagement with CSR practice, are 
ambiguous or under conditions of uncertainty, enterprises may model themselves on other more 
successful or legitimate enterprises to gain legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). 
Due to the lack of overseas experience of young Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI, it is not clear 
whether, how and to what extent Chinese MNEs should participate in CSR. The government 
consciously promotes successful CSR practices, and knowledge of typical MNEs involved in the 
BRI can help other MNEs improve CSR to fulfil the requirements of the BRI. For example, Chinese 
MNEs with excellent CSR performance in the BRI are reported in the Chinese government official 
11 
 
websites and publicized by the government as exemplars. The Corporate Social Responsibility 
Report of the Belt and Road Initiative issued by China Communications Construction is the first 
Chinese enterprise BRI CSR report. The event is shown in official media and websites of the 
Chinese government, which undoubtedly improves this company’s reputation and has had a 
demonstration effect on other companies. These mimetic forces influence Chinese enterprises to 
imitate successful peers and mobilize resources to improving their CSR.  
Normative isomorphism, one of the three types of isomorphism, stems primarily from 
professionalization and established norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Heugens & Lander, 2009), 
which can be produced by universities and professional training institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Although the BRI may have impact on Chinese MNEs’ CSR through normative isomorphism, 
the scope and extent of this kind of isomorphism is extremely limited compared to coercive and 
mimetic isomorphism. Some academic institutions, business organizations or industrial associations 
may hold small-scale seminars or forums with themes of the BRI and CSR. For example, the Think 
Tank of Chinese Industrial Corporate Social Responsibility Research and Beijing Rongzhi Research 
Institute of Corporate Social Responsibility hold the ‘Belt and Road’ Forum on Sustainable 
Development and Responsible Investment. However, it is difficult for the suggestions or ideas of 
such seminars or forums to be widely accepted and integrated into MNEs’ decision-making and 
CSR practice since this kind of discussion is usually attended by a small number of scholars or 
government officers, and what is discussed and proposed is not mandatory and may lack practicality. 
In addition, the professionalization that normative isomorphism basically stems from is influenced 
by coercive and mimetic forces (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Martínez-Ferrero & García-Sánchez, 
2017). Therefore, we argue that it is mainly through coercive and mimetic isomorphism that the BRI 
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affects Chinese MNEs’ CSR.  
Emerging economy firm internationalization is positively associated with home country 
government support (Gaur, Ma, & Ding, 2018). To acquire necessary support or legitimacy, firms 
must respond to institutional pressure by incorporating elements of institutions in their policies and 
actions and failure to conform to institutionalized norms of acceptability can threaten a firm’s 
legitimacy and ultimately its survival (Bondy, Matten, & Moon, 2008). Therefore, Chinese MNEs 
involved in the BRI must respond to home country institutions actively under the two isomorphic 
mechanisms mentioned above. The BRI, which serves as home country institutional pressure, can 
effectively improve the overall CSR performance of Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1).  The BRI, severed as home country institutional pressure, can significantly 
improve the overall CSR performance of Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI. 
 
State- and private- owned MNEs 
Vernon (1979) proposes that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) play multiple roles in the economy. 
SOEs may be the government's actors in the markets and they are the leaders in responding to 
national industrial policies. State-owned enterprises have to comply with state goals to obtain 
legitimacy from the government (Wang et al., 2012; Choudhury & Khana, 2014). In addition, the 
career development and rewards of SOE managers depend largely on whether they succeed in 
fulfilling government goals (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012). Therefore, we argue that the 
effect of coercive and mimetic isomorphism on the willingness and ability to improve CSR is likely 
greater for Chinese state-owned MNEs than private-owned MNEs. 
In terms of CSR, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
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State Council (SASAC) set up a special social responsibility office to coordinate and guide the social 
responsibility of state-owned enterprises, which is an important mechanism innovation for the 
Chinese government to promote state-owned MNEs’ social responsibility. The Chinese government 
strictly monitors CSR of SOEs involved in the BRI through the SASAC, which strengthens the 
institutional pressure of state-owned MNEs through coercive isomorphism compared to private-
owned MNEs. Under the guidance of the SASAC, the Corporate Social Research Center of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has completed a series of reports such as the "Blue Book on 
Corporate Social Responsibility of Central Enterprises" (Hereafter Blue Book) ,"Report on the 
Performance of Central Enterprises in the Belt and Road" and “Research Report on Corporate 
Social Responsibility of Chinese Overseas Enterprises (2016-2017)”, monitoring, providing 
feedback, and managing CSR of state-owned MNEs involved in the BRI. The series of reports 
summarize the existing problems with state-owned MNEs’ CSR. For instance, the Blue Book states 
that 22% of the central enterprises still have not designated or established a department responsible 
for CSR, and the 36% of such enterprises even have not yet established a CSR management system.  
Under the higher coercive isomorphism pressure from the government, compared to private-
owned enterprises, Chinese state-owned MNEs are more likely to fulfil the government's 
requirements specified by the BRI actively and thus perform better in CSR. According to the 
Research Report on Corporate Social Responsibility of Chinese Overseas Enterprises (2016-2017), 
central state-owned enterprises have the highest overseas social responsibility development index 
(42.77) and the score for private enterprises is only 20.93. The Blue Book (2018) also shows that in 
the past three years, 99% of central state-owned enterprises did not suffer any major health or safety 
accidents in their operations in the BRI countries and central state-owned enterprises employed 
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more than 360,000 local employees in these countries. 
In addition, the mimetic pressures on improving CSR are also stronger for state-owned MNEs 
compared with private-owned enterprises under the BRI. State-owned MNEs with excellent CSR 
performance in the BRI are always viewed as successful, designated as national “exemplars”, and 
are praised and supported by the government. For example, Chinese multinational enterprises that 
have issued the BRI CSR reporting are all large central state-owned MNEs, and their excellent and 
outstanding CSR practices are always reported in the government official website or official media. 
Therefore, state-owned enterprises are likely more sensitive to such isomorphic pressure compared 
to private-owned enterprises because state-owned MNEs have similar ownership, experience, 
investment motivation and financial strength to the exemplars and the experience and knowledge of 
the exemplars are more relevant for state-owned enterprises. The mimetic pressures are more likely 
to encourage state-owned MNEs and their managers to imitate successful peers to receive more 
attention from the government because they depend on the government as the resource provider and 
state-owned MNE mangers’ career and rewards depend largely on the performance and fulfillment 
of the government goals (Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012). 
Based on the above literature and practice, we believe that state-owned enterprises play the 
role as the government agency and they subject to higher institutional pressure of the BRI through 
coercive and mimetic isomorphism. Therefore, we put forward the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) The positive relationship between the BRI and overall CSR of Chinese MNEs 
involved in BRI is stronger for state-owned MNEs. 
 
Interactive effect of home- and host-country institutional pressures  
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An MNE and its subsidiaries are closely related. Any irresponsible behavior of an overseas 
subsidiary will jeopardize the legitimacy of the headquarters in the home country and other 
subsidiaries  globally. For example, according to the ‘Guidelines for Preventing and Combating 
Fraud and Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants’, the 
World Bank will sanction the whole company including the headquarters, its subsidiaries, or holding 
enterprises, if one subsidiary of the company conducts corruption or other improper behavior. 
Therefore, negative perception of MNEs in host countries resulting from their irresponsible behavior 
can spill over and will jeopardize the legitimacy of the headquarters in home countries (Kostova, 
Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Surroca, Tribó, & Zahra, 2012). The Chinese 
government hopes that the BRI can enable China to further ‘expand and deepen its opening-up and 
to strengthen its mutually beneficial cooperation with countries in Asia, Europe and Africa and the 
rest of the world’ (Visions and Actions, 2015). The BRI considers Chinese MNEs’ overseas 
subsidiaries involved in the BRI as the main implementers and requires them to fulfil their social 
responsibilities in order to improve the home country’s overseas image, promote smooth progress 
of the BRI, and thus increase the mutual benefits of countries along the BRI (Cheng, 2016). If 
Chinese MNEs fail to obtain legitimacy in host countries, they may be warned or punished by the 
Chinese government or related institutions through the suspension of preferential policies including 
financial support because of not satisfying the BRI requirements.  
For example, a report entitled the "Opinions and Practices for China to Promote the Development 
of Green Finance along the Belt and Road" jointly issued by the Development Research Center of 
the State Council and the Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC) states that, the EIBC as a state-
owned policy bank supports Chinese foreign trade, cross-border investment and the BRI, but it has 
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the power of veto over any loan application if the project does not meet environmental protection 
requirements, and it will not provide any loans to those on a blacklist of polluting companies. 
Following loans, the EIBC keeps monitoring the projects to make sure that they are in compliance 
with the social and environmental protection policies specified in the loan contracts. Any 
irresponsible behaviors in any host countries prevent Chinese MNEs from continuing to obtain 
stable, large and low-cost loans from China’s policy banks, which will certainly affect their 
subsequent overseas investment.  
Therefore, in host countries with high CSR institutional requirements, under the coercive 
isomorphism of the BRI, MNEs need to implement the high CSR standards required by the host 
countries (Marano & Kostova, 2016) and any low CSR performance or irresponsible behavior in 
host countries may imperil their headquarters’ legitimacy under the pressure of the BRI in China. 
On the one hand, the BRI, severed as home institutional pressure, provides the general CSR 
guideline of CSR practices, and urges Chinese MNEs to improve their CSR awareness, ability, and 
performance. On the other hand, the level of CSR improvements following the BRI depends on the 
level of host country institutional pressure. The positive effect of the BRI’ coercive isomorphic 
pressure on MNE CSR is strengthened with high institutional coercive requirements of the host 
country. 
In addition, higher CSR related institutions in host countries expose MNEs to opportunities to 
learn more advanced knowledge and practices for addressing social and environmental issues that 
may not be present in their home countries (Kostova et al., 2008) and thus Chinese MNEs that have 
been successfully operating in host countries usually show better CSR performance. The mimetic 
isomorphism under the BRI towards Chinese MNEs becomes higher when investing in host 
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countries with higher CSR institutions, because Chinese MNEs need to make more efforts to imitate 
to their successful peers to get legitimacy in host countries in order to satisfy the requirements of 
the BRI. Therefore, we argue that the positive effect of the BRI on the level of Chinese MNE CSR 
engagement is contingent on whether the host country has relatively strong institutions about CSR 
practice. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) The higher the level of host country institutional pressure, the stronger the 
positive relationship between the BRI and overall CSR of Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI. 
 
Data, Variables and Methodology 
Data Sources and Sample Selection  
Our sampled firms are those publicly-listed on Chinese domestic stock markets during the 
period 2008-2018. Chinese overseas subsidiary data is obtained from Chinese Listed Firms’ 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment Research Database of the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR). CSMAR is widely used in Chinese listed firm studies and 
includes basic information about firm characteristics, financial data and foreign investment 
such as subsidiary name and host country. CSR data is obtained from the Chinese Corporate 
Social Responsibilities Database (CCSR) from CNRDS. We then merger the firm-level data 
with CSR database according to the stock code and drop the observations whose value of CSR 
is missing. Since the difference-in-differences (DID) method is used to examine the effect of 
the BRI on MNEs’ CSR, we divide the sample into two groups. The treatment group contains 
observations of Chinese multinational enterprises with at least one subsidiary in a BRI country 
before 2014 and maintaining operation there after 2014. The control group, used to compared 
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with the treatment group, includes the Chinese MNEs that never invested in any BRI countries 
during 2008-2018. Considering that some MNEs do not have subsidiaries in, but have a close 
relationship with, the BRI countries through infrastructure construction, overseas project or 
export, the MNEs in the control group that are also included in the “BRI stock” of Hithink 
RoyalFlush are deleted from the sample. In addition, in order to examine the policy shock of 
the BRI proposed in 2014, we only keep the enterprises which operated both before and after 
2014 so that we can compare CSR’s dynamic change before and after the BRI. Host-country 
institution data is obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators and Responsible 
Competitiveness Index respectively and observations with missing value are dropped from the 
sample. Using these selection criteria, we obtain a final sample of 262 enterprises and 2052 
firm-year observations from 2008 to 2018, including 127 enterprises in the treatment group 
with 996 observations and 135 enterprises in the control group with 1056 observations. Table 
9 in Appendix presents the sample distribution by year, industry and host country of the BRI. 
Panel A of Table 11 in Appendix summarizes the sample composition by fiscal year. The 
number of observations increased every year before 2015 and kept steady after that. Panel B 
summarizes the sample distribution by industry according to the Guidelines for the Industry 
Classification of Listed Companies (2012 Revision). Panel C presents the observations by host 
country involved in the BRI according to the definition of CSMAR.  
 
3.2 Construction of key variables  
Dependent variable (CSR)  Cross-border practice diffusion is easier between the 
headquarters and subsidiaries (Tallman & Chacar, 2011) and subsidiaries are one of the 
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channels for passing CSR knowledge and practices to the headquarters (Andersson, Forsgren, 
& Holm, 2001). Therefore, we employ the overall CSR scores of Chinese MNEs as the 
dependent variable considering CSR practice diffusion and spillover within MNE networks. 
For example, in order to obtain the legitimacy in overseas markets, some Chinese MNEs 
obtained the ISO14001 environmental management system certification. Although it is 
essential for overseas subsidiaries, the certification enables the environmental management 
awareness and capabilities of the headquarters and other subsidiaries of Chinese MNEs to be 
improved because of the complicated and strict certification application procedure. In addition, 
the chairman of TCL once mentioned in the financial interview of the 2012 Summer Davos 
Forum that TCL, as an industrial enterprise, must fulfill its social responsibility for energy 
conservation and emission reduction. Initially, overseas customers required that the products 
TCL produced must meet local environmental standards and thus TCL is forced to learn how 
to make their products more environmentally friendly. With the support of the Chinese 
government, TCL became more actively in developing green technology in the domestic market 
and produced more energy-saving and environment-friendly products. The CSR practice of the 
entire MNE network is coordinated globally by the headquarters (Marano & Kostova, 2016; 
Asmussen & Fosfuri, 2019) and in turn advanced CSR knowledge and practice can be diffused 
back to home countries through MNE networks and thus the overall CSR of MNEs can be 
improved finally. Therefore, we consider that the CSR scores obtained from MNEs’ CSR 
reports that include the headquarters and all overseas subsidiaries’ CSR practice or performance 
are suitable for our assessment of the BRI effect on Chinese MNE CSR.  
When measuring CSR scores, the KLD ratings are widely used in CSR studies globally 
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(Flammer & Kacperczyk, 2019), but such ratings don’t contain the CSR performance of 
Chinese enterprises. Previous studies measured Chinese enterprises’ CSR performance mainly 
based on total CSR ratings released by the Rankins CSR Ratings or other rating agencies without 
considering the multiple dimensions of CSR. In our study, we use a new CSR database, the 
Chinese Corporate Social Responsibility Database (CCSR), provided by the Chinese Research 
Data Services Platform (CNRDS) that is often used in China’s research recent years. This 
database contains Chinese listed enterprises’ CSR scores since 2006 and is developed based on 
the framework of KLD. Specifically, in this database, CSR is divided into six dimensions 
including charity and voluntary activities, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, 
environmental protection, and products. Each dimension contains two perspectives: strengths 
and concerns. Enterprises are more prone to disclose information regarding strengths. For 
example, according to the 2019 Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting Survey in China, 
only 26.2% of CSR reports disclosed negative information. Therefore, in order to ensure the 
authenticity and reliability of the database, they use the big data technology to construct the 
index of ‘concerns’ to overcome the drawback of relying on the data provided by firms only.  
We construct three levels of CSR scores using the CCSR database: first, we construct CSR 
scores from the perspective of strengths and concerns. We construct the total CSR strengths 
score（CSR_STR）by summing up the six dimensions of strengths, and the total concerns score 
(CSR_CON）by summing up the six dimensions of concerns (Attig et al.,2016). Second, the 
second level is the six dimensions of CSR score including Charity and Voluntary Activities 
(CSR_CHA), Corporate Governance (CSR_GOV), Diversity (CSR_DIV), Employee Relations 
(CSR_EMP), Environment（CSR_ENV）  and Products (CSR_PRO). The score of each 
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dimension is calculated by using the strength score of each dimension deducted by that of the 
concern score. Third, we construct the total CSR score to evaluate an enterprise’s overall CSR 
performance. Based on Newman et al. (2018) and Attig et al. (2016), the total CSR score is the 
difference between the total CSR strength score (CSR_STR) and total concern score 
(CSR_CON). 
Moderator variables   Since we consider the interactive effect of the BRI and host country 
institutional pressures on Chinese MNEs’ overall CSR, host country institutions should be 
included as a moderator in our research. We use two indexes to measure host countries’ 
institutional pressure related to CSR.  
According to Marano and Kostova (2016), we first use the Responsible Competitiveness 
Index (RCI) to measure host countries’ CSR institutional forces. The RCI measures a country’s 
institutions closely related to CSR based on 21 indicators grouped in seven categories and these 
indicators are developed by the Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability (Zadek & 
McGillvray, 2007; Marano & Kostova, 2016). The RCI has been used as a measure of CSR 
institutional quality in prior studies (e.g. Peng & Beamish, 2008; Marano & Kostova, 2016).   
Second, we use the index of Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) reported by the 
World Bank to measure the general host-country institutional pressure. The WGI consists of six 
measures of a country’s institutional quality including Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law 
and Absence of Corruption. We measure the index as the first principal component of the six 
WGI measures according to Globeman and Shapiro (2003). The WGI is also widely used in 
CSR literature to measure a country’s institutions (e.g. Rathert, 2016; Marano, Tashman, & 
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Kostova, 2016; Keig, Brouthers, & Marshall, 2019). 
In addition, multinational enterprises usually operate in multiple and diverse host countries 
and not all institutions have the same impact on MNE CSR (Cordeiro et al., 2018). Some may 
be more salient according to their relative importance for MNEs (Marano & Kostva, 2016) and 
therefore, we use a weighted average score of institutions to measure the overall institutional 
pressure from all subsidiaries’ host countries and the weight is equal to the number of 
subsidiaries in the host country every year (Attig et al., 2016). 
Last, the dummy variable of state-owned enterprises (SOE_dum) is created as a moderator 
variable according to Sun, Wu and Zhang (2019) to test Hypothesis 2. The data is obtained from 
the database of CSMAR and the value of the variable is 1 if the listed company is state-owned 
(code P5511 in the database), and 0 if private-owned (code P5517 in the database).  
Control Variables  In our analysis, we control for a set of firm- and country-level 
characteristics that may affect a firm’s social engagement. For the firm-level, according to Attig 
et al. (2016), Newman-Kahindi and Stevens (2018) and Boubakri et al. (2016), we include 
following as our control variables. Firm Age (Age) is the number of years that elapsed after the 
firm was established. Firm size (Size) is measured by the natural logarithm value of fixed assets. 
We control for firm age and size because larger and older firms are more visible and thus face 
more CSR pressures from their stakeholders (Brammer, Pavelin, & Porter, 2009). We also 
control for profitability measured by return on assets (ROA), and financial leverage (Leverage) 
measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Higher profitability means that firms have 
more resources and are willing to do more CSR (Dong et al., 2019). Financial leverage implies 
slack resources and firms with more slack resources invest more in CSR (Waddock & Graves, 
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1997). We also control for State ownership (SOE_share) and Foreign ownership (Foreign) 
because existing literature suggests that firms’ foreign ownership or state ownership has a 
significant effect on the environment or CSR performance (McGuinnessa, Vieito, & Wang, 
2017; Pan et al., 2020). All the firm-level data are obtained from CSMAR. Country-level 
control variables include host countries’ residents’ perception and institutions. According to 
Boubakri et al. (2016), we employ a cognitive indicator, residents’ perception of CSR, as control 
variable. The resident’s perception data is collected from the World Value Survey. The index is 
measured by asking ‘Do you think we should give priority to environmental protection even it 
may lead to slow economic growth and employment recession?’ The ratio of respondents 
choosing ‘Yes’ to the investigated population in host countries each year is our control variable 
Perception, representing environmental protection perception of the host country. Responsible 
Competitiveness Index (RCI) is used to control host countries institutional pressure. 
3.3 Summary statistics  
< Table 1  Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix > 
(about here) 
Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics for the key variables used in our regression 
analysis. Panel B resents a correlation matrix for theses variables. The descriptive statistics 
show that the average CSR score of Chinese MNEs is 18.2081. The values of the correlations 
between the variables are low and the variance inflation factors (VIFs) are below 1.17, 
suggesting no serious multicollinearity problems. Table 2 presents the results of the mean-
difference tests for the treatment group before and after the BRI. The results show that the CSR 
differences of Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI before and after the BRI are statistically 
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significant at the 1% level. After the BRI was proposed, the average score of CSR of the 
treatment group is 20.6532 that is significantly higher than the score before the BRI (16.6467). 
Further analysis is conducted in the following part based on the difference-in-differences (DID) 
method.  
< Table 2. Dynamic change of CSR before and after BRI (Treatment Group)> 
(about here) 
3.4 Model Specification: Difference-in-differences 
To examine whether Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI have improved their CSR performance 
responding to the pressure of the BRI, we use the difference-in-differences method, a common 
method for examining policy effects. The DID model is established as follows:  
       0 1= +it it it it i t ind pro itCSR Treat Time X        + + + + + +       (1) 
where subscripts i, t, ind, and pro denote year, firm, industry and province respectively. CSR 
refers to the CSR performance; X is a vector of control variables, including the firm’s Age, Size, 
ROA, financial leverage, state and foreign ownership, RCI and perception. We also include the 
year (γt), firm (γi ), industry (γind) and province (γpro) fixed effects in the model. εit is the random 
disturbances. 
The BRI was firstly proposed at the end of 2013, and became China’s official national 
proposal when it was formally written in the Central Government Work Report in March 2014. 
Therefore, we set the year of 2014, the median, as the policy shock period of the BRI. The time 
dummy variable (Time) is set as follows: if the time of observation was before 2014, the value 
of the Time dummy is 0 and if the time was equal to or after 2014, the value is 1.   
Furthermore, we set group dummy variables (BRI) as follows: MNEs establishing at least 
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one subsidiary in a BRI country before 2014 are included in the treatment group and the value 
of the variable BRI is 1. Chinese MNEs never establishing a subsidiary in any BRI country 
belong to the control group and the value of variable BRI is 0. If an MNE has subsidiaries in 
both the BRI and non-BRI countries, the value of BRI is 1.  
 
Findings 
Results and Discussion  
To assess the effects of the BRI on Chinese MNEs’ overall CSR as hypothesized earlier, we 
analyzed our data using multiple regression analysis, as reported in Table 3. We first developed 
our base model, only including the interactive term and the individual, time, industry, and 
province fixed effect in in Model 1. We then added the control variables in Model 2, including 
the firm age, size, ROA, leverage, state and foreign ownership, RCI and perception. The 
coefficients of the BRI and Time interactive term are both significantly positive in Mode 1 and 
Model 2 (Model 1: β=1.0023, p<.01; Model 2: β=1.0389, p<.01), indicating that the BRI can 
significantly improve the CSR performance of Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1 is verified. Furthermore, we divided CSR into strengths and concerns. As shown 
in Model 3 and Model 4 in Table 3, the coefficient of strengths is positive and significant (Model 
3: β=.9660, p<.01), while the coefficient of the interactive term (Model 4: β=.0738, n.s.) in 
Model 4 is not significant. The results mean that the BRI significantly increases MNEs’ 
responsible behavior. Nevertheless, the existing irresponsible behaviors have still not been 
reduced significantly after the BRI was initiated. Our results are similar to those reported in 
some existing studies. For instance, Zahra and Garvis (2000) find that although more resources 
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are required to increase CSR strengths than reduce CSR concerns, firms still prefer to improve 
CSR strengths rather than reduce concerns.  
< Table 3.  The effect of BRI on Chinese MNEs’ CSR > 
About here 
Table 4 shows the BRI’s effect on the multiple dimensions of CSR. The six CSR dimensions 
were used as the dependent variables respectively and the method of DID was applied. As 
shown in Table 4, the coefficients of the interactive term in Model 4 and Model 6 are positive 
and significant (Model 4: β=.1926, p<.1; Model 6: β=.4374, p<.01). It means that the BRI has 
a great impact on the treatment group’s employee relations and products, such as increasing 
employee bonuses and employee ownership, providing more safety and professional training 
and improving product quality. There is no significant effect on the dimensions of charity and 
voluntary activities, corporate governance, diversity, and environmental protection.  
<Table 4.  The effect of the BRI on detailed dimensions of CSR > 
About here 
State-owned and private-owned MNEs  
We constructed a dummy variable (SOE_dum) to divide the enterprises into state-owned or private-
owned enterprises. We used the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) method to test 
hypothesis 2. As shown in Model 1 of Table 5, the coefficient of the DDD estimator 
(BRI×Time×SOE_dum) is positive and significant (Model 5: β=.9611, p<.05), indicating that 
the positive effect of the BRI on the CSR of Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI is stronger for 
state-owned MNEs and thus hypothesis 2 is supported. The DDD estimators’ coefficients of 
Model 6 and Model 7 of Table 5 are also positive and significant (Model 6: β=.2765, p<.1; 
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Model 7: β=0.5681, p<.01) when examining the BRI’s effect on CSR dimensions, which means 
the positive relationship between the BRI and CSR performance in environmental protection 
and products of Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI is stronger for state-owned MNEs 
compared to private-owned MNEs.  
<Table 5.  State-owned MNEs and private-owned MNEs > 
About here 
We also constructed a dummy variable (ownership_dum) to divide the enterprises into three 
categories according to the degree of state ownership for robustness test. The dummy variable’s 
value is 1, 2, and 3 respectively if the state ownership of an MNE is below 25%, between 25% and 
50%, and greater than 50%. As shown in Model 2 of Table 5, consisting with the results of using 
SOE_dum, the coefficient of the DDD estimator (BRI×Time×ownshierp_dum) is positive and 
significant (β=1.2691, p<.01), indicating that with high state-owned ownership, the positive 
effect of the BRI on the CSR of Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI is strengthened and thus 
results are robustness. The moderating effects of state-ownership on CSR detailed dimensions 
are reported in Table 10 in Appendix. The results show that the positive relationship between 
the BRI and CSR performance in employment and products of Chinese MNEs involved in the 
BRI is stronger for higher state-ownership.  
 
Robustness Test 
In order to ensure the stability and reliability of the estimation results, we conducted robustness 




Common trend test 
Common trend is an important prerequisite for applying DID, which requires that the treatment 
and control groups should have the same trend before the policy was proposed. The results are 
shown in Model 1 of Table 6. The coefficients of the interactive terms after 2014 (Treat×2014, 
and Treat×2015, Treat×2016 and Treat×2017) are significant and the coefficients of the 
interactive terms before 2014 (Treat×2010, Treat×2011, Treat×2012 and Treat×2013) are not 
significant, indicating that the difference between the treatment and control groups becomes 
obvious after 2014 and there was no significant difference before the BRI was proposed. 
Therefore, the common trend assumption is satisfied and the DID method can be used in our 
research. 
Placebo test 
We use the placebo test to check random correlation. If the proposed year of initiative was 
advanced or postponed, and its impact on the treatment group was still significant, it indicates 
that the CSR performance improvement may be caused by other factors or random effects. In 
Model 2 of Table 6, we hypothesized that the proposed year of the initiative was advanced to 
2011 and the proposed year in Model 3 was postponed to 2017, and we also carried out 
regression analysis using the DID method respectively. The results show that the coefficients 
of the interactive terms in Model 2 and Model 3 (Model 2: β=.4924, n.s.; Model 3: β=.1584, 
n.s.) are both insignificant. The results show that the improvement of CSR performance is 
indeed caused by the policy shock in 2014 rather than other factors. 
PSM-DID 
There may exist a problem of self-selection and endogeneity in our sample. To address this potential 
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problem, we adopted the propensity score matching (PSM) method proposed by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) and then combined the PSM with DID to examine the effect of the BRI on Chinese 
MNEs’ CSR. The method of PSM-DID is widely used in literature to solve the problem of sample 
selection bias and endogeneity (e.g. Luo, Xiang, & Zhu, 2017; Sun, Wu, & Zhang, 2019). We 
constructed our control group by finding counterparts for each observation in the treatment group 
through PSM. We used the variables of Age, Size, ROA, Leverage, State Ownership and Foreign 
ownership as the matching covariates to enhance the comparability of the treatment and control 
groups before the BRI so that the two groups of MNEs are as similar as possible except for whether 
they entered the BRI countries. Then the firm-year observation with the nearest p-score to its 
counterpart in the treatment sample was selected as a control group and then the method of DID 
was used. The PSM-DID regression result in Model 4 of Table 6 is still significant (β=1.4007, p<.05), 
proving that our results are robust after adopting the PSM-DID and indicating that the BRI does 
have a significant positive effect on the CSR of Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI.   
Overseas CSR 
Following Naughton, Wang & Yeung (2019), we used the residual approach to calculate overseas 
CSR. The residual method is often used in financial and accounting field to calculate overinvestment, 
abnormal earnings, and abnormal administration expenses to measure corporate risk-taking or rent-
seeking behavior (e.g. Liu et al., 2018; Li, Wu, & Jiang, 2018; Xu, Zhou, & Du, 2019). We consider 
excess CSR as the residual of regression of the enterprise level (enterprise age, size, state-owned 
ownership, foreign ownership, financial leverage, ROA, capital expenditure, and the ratio operating 
income divide by total assets) and CEO characteristics (CEO salary, gender, and duality) variables 
that influence EM-MNEs CSR in the home country. The regression results are in Table 11 in 
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Appendix. Overseas CSR is included in the ‘excess’ CSR estimated from the residual because we 
singled out the factors that would influence only CSR in the home country and then tease out the 
overseas CSR performance to some extent. We then used the residual CSR as the dependent variable 
and used the DID method to examine the BRI’s effect. The regression results are showed in column 
5 in Table 6 and the coefficient of the interactive term is significant and positive ((β=1.1981, 
p<.01), which means that the BRI has a positive effect on Chinese MNEs’ overseas CSR and the 
main results of Table 3 are robust. 
In addition, we also made some attempts to supplement the overseas CSR indicators. The CSR 
indicators we used did include some sub-indices closely related to the overseas CSR. We used two 
sub-indicators, ‘international assistance’ and ‘international environmental certification (ISO14001)’ 
as the dependent variables and examine the BRI’s effect on them and the results are robust. The 
results are in Column 6 and 7 in Table 6. 
< Table 6  Robustness Check > 
About here 
Interaction effect between home- and host- country institutions  
Host-country institution:  Responsible Competitiveness Index (RCI) 
The CSR performance of MNEs may also be influenced by institutional pressures from host 
countries. The RCI is widely used in prior studies to measure a country’s CSR institutional 
quality (e.g. Peng & Beamish, 2008; Marano & Kostova, 2016) and the index is constructed as 
a weighted average of RCI for all host countries of MNEs by the degree of economic 
dependence on these host countries (Marano & Kostova, 2016). The average of all countries’ 
RCI (108 countries in total) reported in the State of Responsible Competitiveness 2007 is 56.67 
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and thus we constructed a dummy variable (RCI_dum). If the weighted average RCI of MNEs’ 
all host countries is greater than 56.67, the value of the dummy variable of RCI_dum is 1, which 
means that the host country’s CSR institutional pressure is higher than the average level of the 
world. If the weighted average RCI is less than 56.67, the value of the RCI_dum is 0. We then 
multiplied RCI_dum with the interactive term (BRI×Time) to construct a new model and 
employed the triple difference (DDD) to examine the interactive effect of the home and host 
countries’ institutional pressures on Chinese MNEs’ CSR performance.  
< Table 7  Host country Institutions (RCI) and the BRI interactive effect > 
About here 
According to the DDD method (e.g. Min, 2018), the coefficient of the triple interaction is 
the estimate controlling for all confounding factors resulting from group-specific and time-
specific trends as well as systematic differences led by different levels of host country 
institutions. As shown in Model 1 of Table 7, the coefficient of the DDD (BRI×Time×RCI) 
estimator is positive and significant (Model 1: β=1.3272, p<.01), indicating that with higher 
CSR institutional pressure of host countries, the positive BRI effect on the CSR of Chinese 
MNEs involved in the BRI is strengthened. Regarding the CSR dimensions, the interactive 
term’s coefficients of Model 5 and Model 7 of Table 7 are positive and significant (Model 5: 
β=0.4148, p<.01; β=0.4821, p<.01), which certifies that, with a higher level of CSR institutional 
pressure of host countries, the positive relationship between the BRI and CSR performance in 
employee relations and products of Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI is strengthened. 
 
Host-country institution:  Worldwide Governance Index (WGI) 
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< Table 8  Host country Institutions (WGI_dum) and the BRI interactive effect > 
About here 
The second indicator we used to measure host-country institutional pressure for robustness test 
is WGI, which is also often used in the CSR literature (e.g. Rather, 2016; Marano, Tashman, & 
Kostova, 2016; Keig, Brouthers, & Marshall, 2019). We calculated the WGI of Chinese MNEs 
as the first principal component of the six WGI measures that are highly correlated (Globerman 
& Shapiro, 2003; Rather, 2016). In order to employ the DDD method, we constructed a dummy 
variable (WGI_dum) and its value is 1 if the index is greater than or equal to 0, and 0 if the 
index is less than 0. 
    The results are showed in Table 8. The coefficient of the DDD estimator (BRI×Time× 
WGI_dum) in Model 1 is also positive and significant (Model 1: β=1.2935, p<.01), which is 
consistent with the results of using RCI as a host-country institution. The results support 
Hypothesis 4 that, with higher general institutional pressure of host countries, the positive 
impact of the BRI on CSR of MNEs involved in the BRI is strengthened. Regarding the CSR 
dimensions, the interactive term’s coefficients of Model 5 and Model 7 of Table 8 are still 
positive and significant (Model 5: β=0.3797, p<.01; Model 7:β=0.4775, p<.01), which means 
only in the dimension of employee relations and product of CSR, the positive effect of the BRI 
on CSR of MNEs involved in the BRI is strengthened with high institutional pressure of host 
countries. 
Discussion and conclusion 
Discussion 
This study focuses on the effect of home-country institutions on the CSR performance of 
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multinational enterprises from emerging economies. Taking the Belt and Road Initiative as an 
example of home-country institutional pressures, this paper examines the BRI’s effect on the 
CSR performance of Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI.  
Firstly, we find that the BRI can significantly improve the CSR performance of Chinese 
MNEs involved in the BRI and the positive relationship is stronger for state-owned MNEs. The 
BRI encourages MNEs to fulfill their CSR (Vision and Actions, 2015). The Chinese government 
attaches great importance to CSR, especially MNEs’ CSR in countries along the Belt and Road. 
As mentioned earlier, emerging economy’s governments own scarce resources that are critical 
to the survival and development of enterprises (Cui & Jiang, 2012). Therefore, corporate 
governance and strategy are highly affected by government. However, we still know little about 
the extent to which corporate strategies of MNEs operating overseas are influenced by home-
country governments. Our research proves that under the institutional pressure of the BRI, the 
MNEs’ CSR has been significantly improved through coercive and mimetic isomorphism, 
especially for state-owned MNEs.  
Furthermore, we divide the CSR into strengths and concerns. The empirical results show 
that the BRI can significantly promote enterprises’ CSR strengths, but cannot reduce CSR 
concerns significantly. The results suggest that MNEs are more willing to increase their 
responsible behaviors because such behaviors are more likely to be observed and publicized by 
the media and government and thus have a more direct impact on improving MNEs’ reputation 
(Zyglidopoulos et al., 2012).  
At the same time, CSR is a multi-dimensional concept (Attig et al., 2016). The empirical 
results show that the BRI plays a significant role in promoting the two CSR dimensions 
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(“Products” and “Employee Relations”), but the effect on CSR’s other dimensions is not 
significant. The result may be due to two reasons: First, MNEs may respond to institutional 
pressures strategically according to the tradeoff between costs and benefits. For example, 
MNEs may focus on improving the CSR in Products and Employee Relations as this may be 
more cost-effective for reputation enhancement than any improvement in other dimensions of 
social responsibility. Second, we employ the DID method to examine the policy shock of the 
BRI on CSR. However, certain CSR dimensions, such as environmental protection, were 
always emphasized by Chinese government before the BRI and this may explain why the policy 
shock of the BRI on this dimension is not significant.  
  Considering the important influence of host country institutional pressures on CSR, this 
paper further examines the interactive effect between home- and host-country institutional 
pressures on EM-MNEs’ CSR performance. Firstly, we use CSR institutional pressures in host 
countries, measured by RCI, to represent host countries’ CSR institutional quality and the 
results show that if a host country has a high level of CSR institutional pressure, the positive 
effect of the BRI on the CSR of Chinese MNEs involved in the BRI is strengthened. We also 
use the WGI to measure the general institutional pressure of host countries and the results are 
consistent with using the indicator of RCI. The positive moderating effect is also significant for 
the two CSR dimensions (Employee relations and Products).  
Practical implications 
The study examines the impact of home-country institutions and its interaction with host-
country institutions on EM-MNE CSR in the context of the BRI. Our study confirms that 
emerging economy’s governments can play an important role in promoting EM-MNE CSR. 
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However, it is not always easy for EM-MNEs to implement CSR. Firstly, EM-MNEs need to 
face diverse and complex host countries with various CSR requirements. As a result, we suggest 
that the Chinese government should pay more attention to Chinese MNEs that invested in host 
countries with low CSR institutional pressure and propose more specific policies to strengthen 
home-country institutional pressures and to fill institutional voids of host countries. For Chinese 
MNEs, they should pay attention to how to respond to the institutional complexity in the cross-
border organizational field. Our study shows that Chinese MNEs are more likely to significantly 
improve their CSR practices under the pressure of the BRI when operating in host countries 
with high CSR related institutional requirements. We suggest that Chinese MNEs should also 
significantly improve their CSR level in host countries with lower CSR institutional 
requirements in order to maintain their global legitimacy. For example, MNEs in polluting 
industries tend to standardize their environmental standards globally at a level that meets or 
exceeds the strictest environmental standards of all host countries they face (Madsen, 2009; 
Marano & Kostova, 2016) in order to reduce the loss of global legitimacy due to negative 
spillover effects (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Secondly, in addition to taking the initiative to do 
some positive CSR practices that are easily reported by the media, and easily known by the 
public and the home-and host-government, Chinese MNEs should also actively correct and 
reduce some hidden CSR problems such as accounting irregularities, production accidents and 
environmental pollution. In fact, any irresponsible behavior will eventually have a negative 
impact on company reputation. Thirdly, CSR is a multi-dimension concept, but enterprises are 
inclined to just improve certain dimensions of CSR according to their interests. For example, 
under pressures of the BRI, Chinese MNEs actively improve the dimensions of employee 
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relations and products. Therefore, Chinese governments and MNEs should pay special attention 
to the CSR dimensions that are easily overlooked. In addition, Chinese MNEs should not only 
meet the requirements of the home-country institutions, but also actively understand and meet 
specific demands and expectations in host countries. Chinese MNEs and governments should 
pay more attention to the voice of local residents when operating overseas and also satisfy the 
demands of local people and understand the importance of publicization in host countries.  
Overall, our research provides theoretical implications and practical suggestions for the 
Chinese government and the BRI to promote Chinese MNEs’ CSR, maintain a good overseas 
image and thereby enhance mutual trust and regional cooperation among countries along the 
BRI. At the same time, we provide specific corporate governance and strategy 
recommendations for Chinese MNEs, with the hope of helping MNEs to better fulfill their CSR 
in their participation in the BRI and gain global legitimacy.  
Limitation and future Research 
Firstly, we use MNEs’ overall CSR score to examine the BRI effect. In future, more detailed CSR 
scores, such as Chinese MNEs’ overseas CSR or CSR in certain host countries, should be used in 
the research and therefore the learning and diffusion effect of overseas CSR knowledge or practice 
between headquarters and overseas subsidiaries, or among overseas subsidiaries can be examined. 
New techniques, such as data mining and content analysis, can be used to construct new indexes of 
Chinese MNEs’ overseas CSR in future to deepen the research of CSR in international business.  
Secondly, powerful government is an important characteristic in China’s economic 
development, and Chinese enterprise internationalization strategy is significantly affected by the 
evolution of Chinese institutions. However, emerging economies are not homogenous, even within 
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the same geographic region (Hoskisson et al., 2000). For example, even in East Asia, there are 
differences between China and other emerging economies such as Korea in terms of the role of 
home country institutions (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Therefore, the conclusions of this study may not 
be totally applicable to other emerging economies. The role of home institutions on EM-MNEs’ 
CSR still needs to be examined further and we look forward to more research in the future focusing 
on this topic using data from other emerging economies.  
Finally, further research is needed to find out why Chinese home-country institutional 
pressures only affect two dimensions of CSR. Is it because the host or home country government 
has more demands for these two dimensions of CSR, or an improvement in these two dimensions 
can achieve better performance or reputation? Lots of questions still need to be answered.  
Conclusion 
CSR literature in international business usually focuses on the effect of host country’s institutions 
on MNEs’ CSR and thus home country institutional pressure is under-researched (Buchanan & 
Marques, 2018). In this research, we take China’s BRI as an example of home institutional pressure 
and employ the difference-in-differences (DID) method to examine the impact of the BRI and its 
interaction with host country institutions on Chinese MNEs’ CSR. The results show that the BRI 
can significantly improve Chinese MNEs’ CSR performance and the positive relationship is 
stronger for state-owned MNEs. We also find that the positive relationship between the BRI 
and Chinese MNEs’ CSR performance is strengthened by high CSR-related institutional 
pressures of host countries. The research contributes to the growing literature on MNEs’ CSR by 
identifying the impact of home country institutions on MNEs’ CSR from institutional theory and 
revealing the BRI unique effect on MNEs’ CSR which has not been examined before. The research 
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provides practical suggestions for the Chinese government to guide Chinese MNEs to further 
improve their CSR performance in order to ensure the smooth progress of the BRI, strength the 
regional cooperation and lay the foundation of globalization. At the same time, this study provides 
suggestions for Chinese MNEs to improve their CSR to ensure that they can get dual legitimacy 
both in home- and host-countries and thus enhance their global reputation and performance.  
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Observations Mean S.d. Min. P50 Max 
CSR 2052 18.2081 6.3027 2 18 39 
CSR_STR 2052 18.6881 6.3151 4 18 39 
CSR_CON 2052 0.4800 0.6927 0 0 4 
Age 2052 18.2203 5.7761 3 18 38 
Size 2052 21.6842 1.8858 16.7807 21.5224 26.6222 
ROA 2052 0.0102 0.0135 -0.0580 0.0070 0.1029 
Leverage 2052 0.5410 0.2060 0.0089 0.5632 1.2755 
SOE share 2052 0.0605 0.1472 0 0 0.8053 
Foreign share 2052 0.0098 0.0727 0 0 0.8855 
RCI 2052 67.0013 4.0942 48 68.3 74.9 
WGI 2052 1.6670 0.8828 -1.8935 1.9370 4.5830 
Perception 2052 0.4699 0.1280 0.0001 0.4868 0.7362 
Panel B. Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 CSR 1            
2 CSR_STR 0.9940 1           
3 CSR_CON -0.0371 0.0727 1          
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4 Age 0.1463 0.1481 0.0191 1         
5 Size 0.4165 0.4377 0.2013 0.0886 1        
6 ROA -0.0301 -0.0388 -0.0793 -0.0844 -0.1009 1       
7 Leverage 0.1835 0.1977 0.1322 0.2008 0.4280 -0.3708 1      
8 SOE share -0.0921 -0.0923 -0.0035 -0.2118 0.0236 0.0125 0.0091 1     
9 Foreign  -0.0205 -0.0264 -0.0541 0.0108 -0.0649 0.1040 -0.0749 0.0021 1    
10 RCI -0.0551 -0.0606 -0.0519 0.0513 -0.0373 0.0091 -0.0833 -0.0021 0.0244 1   
11 WGI -0.0654 -0.0684 -0.0285 0.0394 -0.0338 0.0109 -0.0614 0.0329 0.0048 0.8247 1  






Table 2.   Dynamic change of CSR before and after BRI (Treatment Group) 
Variables 
Treatment Group  Before BRI  After BRI  Difference 
Mean Median  Mean Medium  Mean Medium  t-test z-test 
CSR 19.0361 18  16.6467 16  20.6532 21  -9.4462*** -8.882*** 
CSR_Strengths 19.5050 19  17.0896 16  21.1397 21  -9.5232*** -8.974*** 
CSR_Concerns 0.4689 0  0.4428 0  0.4865 0  -0.9855 -1.462 
Age 17.7279 17  15.1368 14  19.4815 19  -12.3523*** -12.437*** 
Size 22.1150 21.9928  21.8939 21.7546  22.2646 22.2584  -3.0345*** -3.437*** 
ROA 0.0100 0.0072  0.0122 0.0092  0.0085 0.0059  4.7629*** 5.185*** 
Leverage 0.5551 0.5771  0.5432 0.5595  0.5633 0.5869  -1.6655* -1.802* 
SOE share 0.0535 0  0.0856 0  0.0318 0  6.1993*** 3.848*** 
Foreign 0.0104 0  0.0183 0  0.0050 0  2.5985*** 3.816*** 
RCI 65.2320 66.5195  64.9684 66.3577  65.4103 66.5755  -1.4213 -0.424 
Perception 0.4356 0.4373  0.4259 0.4337  0.4422 0.4393  -2.2144** -1.958** 
Note： *、**、*** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 





(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BRI ×Time 1.0023*** 1.0398*** 0.9660*** -0.0738 
 (0.3036) (0.3024) (0.2985) (0.0482) 
Age 
 
0.6094*** 0.6498*** 0.0403*** 
 
 
(0.0569) (0.0561) (0.0091) 
Size 
 





(0.1921) (0.1896) (0.0306) 
ROA 
 
-6.9373 -7.8607 -0.9234 
 
 
(8.9332) (8.8166) (1.4233) 
Leverage 
 
0.0158 0.3495 0.3338** 
 
 
(0.9780) (0.9652) (0.1558) 
SOE share 
 
-1.4150** -1.2169* 0.1981* 
 
 
(0.6660) (0.6573) (0.1061) 
Foreign share  1.9927 2.0230 0.0302 
  (1.3681) (1.3503) (0.2180) 
RCI 
 
-0.0511 -0.0428 0.0082 
 
 
(0.0471) (0.0465) (0.0075) 
Perception  -0.2439 -0.2370 0.0069 
  (1.3004) (1.2834) (0.2072) 
Constant 14.1180*** -8.9253* -9.6910* -0.7657 
 (0.3814) (5.0347) (4.9690) (0.8022) 
Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y 
Observed values 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 
R2 0.3422 0.3543 0.3793 0.0569 
Number of Firms 262 262 262 262 
Notes: *, **, *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; Standard errors in parentheses;  
Y denotes yes. 
 
 
Table 4.   The impact of the BRI on detailed dimensions of CSR 
Variables 
CSR_CHA CSR_GOV CSR_DIV CSR-EMP CSR_ENV CSR_PRO 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BRI ×Time 0.1673 0.0739 0.0020 0.1926* 0.1667 0.4374*** 
 (0.1028) (0.0731) (0.0631) (0.1047) (0.1152) (0.1151) 
Constant -5.5795*** -2.1240* -2.5883** 0.4581 -1.7697 2.6782 
 (1.7110) (1.2164) (1.0512) (1.7428) (1.9175) (1.9160) 
Control variable Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 
R2 0.1297 0.2565 0.2482 0.2915 0.0868 0.0561 
Number of Firms 262 262 262 262 262 262 
Notes: *, **, *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; Standard errors in parentheses;  
Y denotes yes. 
 
 








CSR_CHA CSR_GOV CSR_DIV CSR-EMP CSR_ENV CSR_PRO 
(1) (2) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
BRI×Time×SOE_dum 
0.9611**  -0.0239 -0.0016 0.0634 0.0786 0.2765* 0.5681*** 
(0.4275)  (0.1462) (0.1012) (0.0879) (0.1636) (0.1471) (0.1616) 
BRI×Time×Ownership_dum 
 1.2691***       
 (0.3253)       
Constant 
-8.9742 -3.8250 -7.0104*** -3.3210* -1.7798 -1.1671 3.2846 1.0195 
(7.4148) (7.0450) (2.5362) (1.7554) (1.5243) (2.8370) (2.5520) (2.8032) 
Control variable Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Interaction effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observed value 1,844 2,052 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 1,844 
R2 0.5155 0.5443 0.3394 0.4531 0.4553 0.2982 0.4568 0.2966 
Number of Firms 236 262 236 236 236 236 236 236 
Notes: *, **, *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; Standard errors in parentheses;  
Y denotes yes. 
 















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
BRI ×Time  0.4924 0.1584 1.4007** 1.1981*** 0.0833*** 0.1468*** 
  (0.4559) (0.3483) (0.5561) (0.3438) (0.0189) (0.0345) 
Treat×2010 0.3989       
 (0.7974)       
Treat×2011 0.2228       
 (0.7306)       
Treat×2012 0.9258       
 (0.6987)       
Treat×2013 0.7674       
 (0.6757)       
Treat×2014 1.3153*       
 (0.6749)       
Treat×2015 1.1170*        
 (0.6733)       
Treat×2016 2.1451***       
 (0.6733)       
Treat×2017 1.7201**       
 (0.6742)       
Treat×2018 1.5926**       
 (0.6716)       
Control Variable Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,052 867 1,185 2,020 1,598 2,052 2,052 
R2 0.3565 243 261 0.0764 0.0098 0.0451 0.0990 
Notes: *, **, *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; Standard errors in parentheses;  











Table 7.  Host country Institutions (RCI) and the BRI interactive effect  
Variables 
Overall CSR  CSR_CHA CSR_GOV CSR_DIV CSR-EMP CSR_ENV CSR_PRO 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
BRI×Time×RCI_dum 
1.3272*** 0.1268 0.0994 0.0263 0.4148*** 0.1778 0.4821*** 
(0.3486) (0.1202) (0.0851) (0.0740) (0.1215) (0.1359) (0.1339) 
Constant 
-4.2754 -4.2550 -2.1244 -3.4536** 1.7865 0.2728 3.4983 
(7.5868) (2.6148) (1.8512) (1.6106) (2.6447) (2.9577) (2.9131) 
Control variable Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Interaction effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observed value 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 
R2 0.5211 0.3361 0.4375 0.4236 0.4671 0.2902 0.2873 
Number of Firms 262 262 262 262 262 262 262 
Notes: *, **, *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; Standard errors in parentheses;  
Y denotes yes. 
 
 
Table 8.   Host country Institutions (WGI_dum) and the BRI interactive effect  
Variables 
Overall CSR  CSR_CHA CSR_GOV CSR_DIV CSR-EMP CSR_ENV CSR_PRO 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
BRI×Time×WGI_dum 1.2935*** 0.1071 0.1174 0.0400 0.3797*** 0.1719 0.4775*** 
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(0.3551) (0.1221) (0.0866) (0.0752) (0.1243) (0.1377) (0.1362) 
Constant 
-2.7036 -3.2925 -2.4420 -2.5648 3.1335 -1.2530 3.7153 
(7.3888) (2.5397) (1.8020) (1.5654) (2.5867) (2.8655) (2.8341) 
Control variable Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Interaction effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observed value 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 
R2 0.5185 0.3361 0.4351 0.4228 0.4596 0.2938 0.2850 
Number of Firms 262 262 262 262 262 262 262 
Notes: *, **, *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively; Standard errors in parentheses;  
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Figure 2.  Moderating effect of WGI 
 
 
Table 9.  Sample composition   (N=262, Observations= 2052 ) 













Panel B. By industry  
Industry code Observations Industry code Observations Industry code Observations 
A01 9 C28 11 F51 19 
A04 4 C29 11 F52 62 
B06 24 C30 43 G54 23 
B07 7 C31 47 G55 51 
B09 48 C32 129 G56 30 
B11 22 C33 27 G58 10 
C13 17 C34 22 I63 19 
C14 33 C35 100 I64 18 
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High WGI Low WGI
52 
 
C17 22 C37 21 J66 55 
C18 15 C38 85 J67 76 
C19 8 C39 213 J68 37 
C22 27 C42 5 J69 14 
C23 7 D44 39 K70 95 
C24 6 D45 8 L72 18 
C25 2 D46 17 Q83 9 
C26 116 E48 52   
C27 103 E50 17   
Panel C. By host country (BRI country) 
Country Observations Country Observations 
Afghanistan 11 Mongolia 2 
UAE 111 Bangladesh 4 
Egypt 29 Burma 15 
Pakistan 20 Japan 140 
Bahrain 1 Saudi Arabia 20 
Belarus 1 Sri Lanka 8 
North Macedonia 1 Slovakia 8 
Poland 31 Tajikistan 6 
Russia 150 Thailand 64 
Philippines 20 Turkey 17 
Kazakhstan 26 Ukraine 1 
South Korea 98 Uzbekistan 18 
Montenegro 3 Singapore 273 
Kyrgyzstan 6 Hungary 8 
Czech 4 Iran 1 
Qatar 8 Israel 14 
Croatia 1 India 105 
Laos 35 Indonesia 100 
Romania 10 Jordan 1 
Malaysia 81 Vietnam 60 
Note: Industry code comes from the Guidelines for the Industry Classification of Listed Companies (2012 Revision). 
 
Table 10.  The effect of State-ownership on the BRI and detailed CSR dimensions 
Variables 
CSR_CHA CSR_GOV CSR_DIV CSR-EMP CSR_ENV CSR_PRO 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
BRI×Time×Ownership 
0.1678 0.0689 0.0452 0.3911*** 0.1123 0.4839*** 
(0.1127) (0.0801) (0.0698) (0.1146) (0.1281) (0.1256) 
Constant 
-6.0281** -3.4355** -0.9503 4.3451* -1.0346 3.2784 
(2.4409) (1.7348) (1.5116) (2.4821) (2.7743) (2.7200) 
Control variable Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Interaction effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
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Observed value 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 2,052 
R2 0.3616 0.4549 0.4397 0.4821 0.3109 0.3144 
Number of Firms 262 262 262 262 262 262 
 

































Table 12.  The definitions and components of CSR dimensions 




The company supports education, such as 





Charity The company has projects of charity giving. 
Volunteer activity 
The company has outstanding volunteer 
activities. 
International assistance 
The company has behavior of international 
assistance. 
Promote employment 
The company has policies to promote 
employment 
Promote local economy 
The company has policy or behavior of 
promoting the economic development of local 
communities, such as employment localization.  
Others 
Other strengths belonging to the dimension of 
Charity, Volunteer Activities and Social Disputes 
are not included in the above indicators. 
Concerns Financing dispute 







The report covers compressive information of 
social responsibility, including shareholder, 
creditors, employees, customers, communities 
and environment. Or G3 system is used in the 
report. 
CSR column The website has CSR column. 
CSR department The company has CSR department. 
CSR vision 
The company has the philosophy, vision and 
values of social responsible in the area of 
economic, society and environment. 
CSR training The company has CSR training. 
Reliability of CSR report CSR report has reliability guarantee. 
Others 
Other strengths belonging to the dimension of 
Corporate Governance are not included in the 
above indicators. 
Concerns Accounting irregularities 
The company has behavior of accounting 
irregularities. 
Diversity Strengths CPC member 
There are CPC members among directors, 




There is at least one woman in the company's 
executive team. 
Female directors 
The number of women in the board of directors is 
more than or equal to 4. 
Innovative human 
resources project 
The company has innovative human resources 
projects for the disabled or the released people. 
Or have a good reputation in employing disabled 
and released people. 
Others 
Other strengths belonging to the dimension of 
Diversity are not included in the above indicators. 
Concerns No female executives 






The company strongly encourages employees to 
participate in or own the ownership of the 
company with stock options; Share earnings and 
own stock; Or participate in management 
decisions; Or establish a salary incentive 
mechanism 
Employee welfare 












Company certified for occupational safety. 
Professional training 




The company has better communication channels 
for employees' opinions or suggestions to be 
communicated to senior management. 
Others 
Other strengths belonging to the dimension of 





Employee safety disputes 
For example, the company paid a large amount of 
fines or civil compensation for violating 
employee health and safety standards; Or the 
company is involved in a major health and safety 
dispute. 
Layoffs 
For example, the company has undergone 






The company developed or used environmentally 
innovative products, equipment, or technology. 
Reduce three wastes 
The company adopted policies, measures, or 
technologies to reduce emissions of waste gas, 
waste water, waste residue and greenhouse gases 
Recycle economy 
Companies uses renewable energy or adopts 
recycle economy policies and measures. 
Energy conservation 
The company has policy, measures, or 
technologies to save energy. 
Green office 




The company passes the certification of the 
ISO14001 environmental management system. 
Environmental 
commendation 
The company received environmental 
commendation or other positive reviews 
Others 
Other strengths belonging to the dimension of 





For example, companies are penalized for 
environmental issues. 
Pollutant emissions 




The company has a product quality management 
system. 
After-sale service 
The company continues to improve its after-sales 
services. 





The company has obtained certifications and 
honors in product quality. 
Anti-corruption measures 
Company has anti-commercial bribery measures 
or anti-corruption measures. 
Strategic sharing 
The company and business partners have 
established strategic sharing mechanisms and 
platforms, including long-term strategic 
cooperation agreements, shared experimental 
bases, shared databases, and stable 
communication platforms. 
Integrity management 
The company has the values and guarantee 
system of integrity management and fair 
competition. 
Others 
Other strengths belonging to the dimension of 
Products are not included in the above indicators. 
Concerns Product dispute 
The company has recently been involved in major 
disputes or regulatory actions due to product or 
service safety issues, and has paid fines or civil 
compensation. 
 
